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ABSTRACT: Proprietary rule, whereby the state is owned by a ruler
who maximizes tax revenues minus the costs of governing, is a useful ideal
type that describes many of the states that have ever existed. The study of
proprietary rule and its public ￿nance, however, is comparatively scarce. I
argue that proprietary rule emerges out of anarchy and its main alternative
- self-governance - has di¢ culties surviving because of problems in providing
e⁄ective internal and external security. Competitive proprietary rule (or,
organized anarchy) is the market structure for the provision of security that
is more stable, but is highly ine¢ cient because all the savings that come
out of the public provision of security are dissipated into contests for power
among proprietary rulers. I also explore how competitive proprietary rule
can be consolidated into more complex forms of governance.
* I would like to thank Leonard Dudley and other participants at the con-
ference on "Coercion, Welfare, and Public Finance," held at the Economics
Department at Georgia State University, in September 2010, and seminar
participants at Florida State University.
11 Introduction
Proprietary Public Finance is a term that, to my knowledge, was ￿rst intro-
duced by Grossman and Noh (1994). It refers to the ideal type of a state
owned by a single entity ￿the Emperor, the King, the ruler ￿who maximizes
the di⁄erence between tax receipts and the costs of running the state. These
costs may well include expenditures on public goods since such goods typi-
cally enhance production and thus increase tax receipts up to a point. This is
a very di⁄erent type of public ￿nance than the traditional ideal type, whereby
taxes and expenditure policies are considered to be welfare-maximizing. It
is also di⁄erent from the more pragmatic approaches in which public ￿nance
is determined by mixtures of lobbying and parliamentary politics.1
Given that the vast majority of states that have existed up to modern
times have been autocracies and, at least for many of them, there was no
essential distinction between the ￿nances of the state and the ￿nances of
its ruler, proprietary public ￿nance has received comparatively little atten-
tion. Brennan and Buchanan (1985), while recognizing the historical impor-
tance of "Leviathan," concentrate on normative issues, on how to constrain
"Leviathan." To my knowledge, Engineer (1989) was the ￿rst to model the
basic choices of a proprietary ruler and contrast them to the case of welfare-
maximizing public ￿nance. Findlay (1990) also developed a basic model of
a proprietary ruler with reference to the political economy of development,
whereas Findlay (1996) presented a spatial model of the extent of empire, of
which public ￿nance was a concern. Grossman and Noh (1994) emphasized
the endogeneity of the horizon of a ruler￿ s rule on the ruler￿ s own policies;
that is, how a ruler, by over-taxing and underspending on public goods,
would likely have a shorter rule because of a higher probability of success-
ful revolt. Therefore, a ruler who is more likely to survive in the long-run
should be someone who does not tax and spend like there is no tomorrow.
Such an insight is probably behind McGuire and Olson￿ s (1996) and Olson￿ s
(1993) more celebrated argument that a stationary bandit is superior to a
roving bandit, even though there was no formal argument made in the static
model of McGuire and Olson (1996). Moselle and Polak (2001) have ex-
plored di¢ culties in proprietary rule achieving anything close to e¢ ciency as
has Robinson (1997). A distinct rationale for the relative superiority of the
1See Winer and Hettich (2006) for an overview and the exchange in Buchanan and
Musgrave (1999). Wintrobe (1998) goes beyond public ￿nance to provide a more compre-
hensive analysis of autocratic rule (which is not synonymous with proprietary rule).
2stationary bandit to that of Grossman and Noh is found in Myerson (2008),
who shows how rulers could do better when there are restraints on their rule,
interpreted as constitutional checks on a ruler￿ s power, and how these can
emerge as equilibria in dynamic contests for power.
Apart from the analysis of the proprietary state when it is taken as given,
there is also the question of why have such states being so common in his-
tory and why in many places in the world today autocracies and kleptocracies
(which can be approximated by the proprietary ideal type of state) are still
rather common. In this paper I argue that proprietary states are likely to
emerge out of anarchy as the dominant form of state organization because
violence or the threat of violence are the primary means of enforcement in
such settings. Unlike the case of a modern state where anyone can buy se-
curity services from a ￿rm like Brinks Security without fearing its personnel
for extortion (because Brinks can be sued and one ultimately relies on the
courts and enforcement agencies of a modern state), under anarchy security
and protection cannot be bought and sold like other goods and services be-
cause the service itself is about the means of enforcement. There is nothing
holding back the provider of security in demanding even more than those
who originally threatened the purchaser of protection and induced the need
for that purchase. If Brinks and its employees did not face the threat of
being sued and jailed, there would be nothing other social norms in holding
back against extorting their clients. Sometimes policemen with low super-
vision, especially in weak states, as well as ma￿osi do play the dual role or
protector and extortionist. There is a reason that the de￿ning characteristic
of the state in its common Weberian de￿nitions centers around the near-
monopoly in the use of force because without that near-monopoly contracts
on everything else become di¢ cult or impossible to enforce.
I explore the provision of protection systematically, starting from the
proverbial state of nature or anarchy and analyzing the industrial organi-
zation of protection using a simple model. In doing so I rely on Skaper-
das (1992), Konrad and Skaperdas (1998), Skaperdas (2008) and especially
Konrad and Skaperdas (2010). Following the logic described above, in this
analysis no contract can be enforced in any other way other than the relative
ability of adversaries to use force.
Section 2 introduces a very simple model of atomized anarchy and de-
scribes how collective protection could be improve outcomes over that condi-
tion. Collective protection can be employed either by self-governing groups
or by for-pro￿t, proprietary rulers. Section 3 analyzes the case of a monop-
3olistic proprietary ruler who provides collective protection to producers in
exchange for tribute, the size of which is determined by the relative ability of
producer and ruler to use force. While total output can be higher than output
under atomized anarchy, all the extra output is appropriated by the single
ruler while producers could even be worse o⁄ than under anarchy. Section
4 examines how di⁄erent proprietary rulers compete to essentially capture
producers within a given territory and behave in other ways just as a single
monopolistic ruler does. In the long run, the number or rulers is endogenous
and all the bene￿ts of collective protection are shown to be dissipated in
the competition among rulers. It is also argued that self-governing political
entities that could provide collective protection in a democratic fashion have
di¢ culties surviving in the presence of proprietary rulers, primarily because
of the small size that is needed to control free-rider problems. Thus, com-
petitive proprietary rule (or, organized anarchy) appears to be the type of
market structure that is the more stable among those examined.
Section 5 explores avenues through which competitive proprietary rule
could evolve to become more consolidated and e¢ cient, though still remain-
ing proprietary and perhaps more hierarchical. After discussing the problems
with folk-theorem type of arguments, I brie￿ y discuss ways in which the rulers
themselves could make investments in elementary forms of commitment de-
vices so as to increase e¢ ciency.
2 Atomized Anarchy and Collective Protec-
tion
Consider ￿rst a hypothetical simple setting in which individuals are truly
atomized so that they have no connection to any other individual and no
collective organizations of any kind exist. There are two possible occupations,
those of producer and bandit. Producers have one unit of time that they can
devote to two activities: self-protection against bandits (x) and production
(1￿x): Bandits engage full-time in their occupation, which is trying to locate
producers and extract from them as much as possible. For simplicity,2 we
suppose that a producer can keep a share x of his output away from bandits,
2For more general formulations of this and other parts of the model, see Skaperdas
(2008) and Konrad and Skaperdas (2010).
4so that his payo⁄ is the following:3
￿p = x(1 ￿ x) (1)
The remainder of the production of each producer, (1￿x)(1￿x) = (1￿x)2,
is appropriated by bandits. Moreover, the more producers there are relative
to bandits, the higher is the payo⁄of a bandit. Letting P denote the number
of producers and B the number of bandits, the payo⁄ of a particular bandit
is as follows:




Given the producer￿ s payo⁄in (1), the optimal choice of self-protection is
1=2; leaving the remainder 1=2 for production. Thus, the payo⁄of a producer
is ￿￿
p = (1=2)(1=2) = 1=4:
If the payo⁄ of bandits were higher than the payo⁄ of producers, then
there would be a tendency of producers becoming bandits. Similarly, if the
payo⁄s of bandits were lower than that of producers, bandits would want
to become producers. Therefore, a long-run equilibrium condition for an
atomized anarchic economy is that the payo⁄s of producers and peasants are
equalized, or that ￿￿
p = ￿￿
b (which, in this example, equals 1=4). Given the
payo⁄ for bandits in (2), ￿￿
p = 1=4 = (1=2)2 P
B and the equilibrium condition
in our example implies that the number of producers equals the number of
bandits (P ￿ = B￿): Letting N denote the total population, the constraint
P ￿ + B￿ = N implies P ￿ = B￿ = N=2: That is, in long-run equilibrium
under atomized autarky we have the following outcomes:
￿ Payo⁄s of producers and bandits: ￿￿
p = ￿￿
b = 1=4:
￿ Populations of producers and bandits: P ￿ = B￿ = 1
2N:
￿ Total output: 1
4N
3Technologies of protection, violence, and ￿ghting, of course, can get a lot more compli-
cated than that. Hirshleifer (1989) ￿rst compared di⁄erent functional forms and a sizable
literature has emerged on the properties of such functions (see, e.g., Jia, 2008; Rai and
Sarin, 2009; Corchon and Dahm, 2010).
Changes in such technologies over the course of history have been critical in creating
new types of states and in the "industrial organization of protection." Dudley (1991) has
examined the role of such changes in the technologies of ￿ghting in history.
5Note that total potential output, under which the whole population would
become full-time producers, is N: The long-run equilibrium output, 1
4N; is
lower than that because bandits do not contribute anything to production
and producers have to divert some of the resources to defending against
bandits. The nature of the technology of self-protection is critical in how
many resources are wasted on banditry and self-protection. A more e⁄ective
technology of self-protection would induce both fewer resources devoted to
self-protection and less banditry.
Collective protection and self-governance
Typically, however, we can expect measures that do not just protect an
individual producer but have positive (external or other) e⁄ects on other pro-
ducers to be collectively more e⁄ective. Such measures could include warning
systems about the presence of bandits in the area, the formation of a mili-
tia that becomes active when there is a threat, the building of rudimentary
forti￿cations to protect crops or other property, the employment of full-time
guards and policemen, or even the building of villages themselves with an
eye towards security.
Consider a group of m producers and suppose that y resources per pro-
ducer were to be devoted to such a type of collective protection. If such
protection were to be more e⁄ective than individual self-protection, then
each individual producer should be able to keep more of his production
away from bandits by using this collective protection and committing y to
it than devoting the same resources to self-protection. That is, denoting by
h(
￿y
m ) = h(y) the share of a producer￿ s output that is kept away from ban-
dits when all the members of a group of size m contribute y to collective
protection, we expect h(y) > y: For simplicity, from now on we suppose that
h(y) =
p









This collective protection technology could be employed not just by groups
of producers contributing their own time and e⁄ort but also by entrepreneurs
who could hire "guards" to protect peasants from bandits. The two possible
methods of employing the collective protection technology ￿a self-governing
group of producers and a specialized entrepreneur who hires guards ￿might
seem equivalent. It could be argued, for example, that, instead of the produc-
ers contributing their own time and e⁄ort, they could pay the corresponding
amount to a group of guards or a security agency that would hire guards so as
to protect the producers against bandits. This, however, assumes that there
6is already a third party that would be able to enforce a contract between the
producers and the security agency, something that clearly assumes an answer
already exists to the protection and security problem that we have sought to
examine in the ￿rst place. In the absence of third-party enforcement, instead
of protecting the producers, a group of guards or a leader who has managed
to put together a group of guards under his aegis could conceivably extract
even more out of the producers than simple bandits could.
Unless the security agency consists of the rough but moral do-gooders
that appear in movies like The Seven Samurai or The Magni￿cent Seven,
relying on such organized enforcers to protect a group of producers against
bandits does not appear to be a realistic alternative to the producers of just
banding together and using the collective protection technology themselves.
Analyzing how groups of producers who do use the collective protection tech-
nology in a self-governing fashion is straightforward (for a detailed analysis,
see Konrad and Skaperdas, 2010). Under Nash equilibrium behavior in the
contribution of producers to collective protection, there is predictably under-
contribution relative to the e¢ cient outcome and the contribution is lower
the larger is the size of the group. However, the payo⁄of producers is always
higher than the payo⁄ under atomistic anarchy because the more e¢ cient
collective protection technology allows the producers to both decrease the
resources they devote to protection ￿thus increasing useful output ￿and to
increase the share they keep away from bandits. With the total population
dividing itself into groups of producers and individual bandits, the bandits
would also be better o⁄ (otherwise, they wouldn￿ t want to become bandits)
but there would be fewer of them. That is, the collective protection tech-
nology allows an increase in total output for two reasons: both the output
of individual producers and the number of producers increases.
Such a state of a⁄airs supposes the absence of large predators, of or-
ganized bandits, or of entrepreneurs who can use the collective protection
technology for their own bene￿t. I will brie￿ y come back to a discussion
of the long-run viability of self-governing groups only after analyzing the
industrial organization of collective protection in the presence of for-pro￿t,
proprietary rule.
73 Monopolistic Proprietary Rule
We consider ￿rst a single entrepreneur, a ruler or "Leviathan", who has a
monopoly in the provision of collective protection. The ruler hires guards
to protect producers from bandits and receives taxes (or, tribute) from the
producers. His objective is to maximize the di⁄erence between taxes and
costs.
Even for proprietary rulers, tax rates are typically assumed to be passively
set by the ruler (that includes all the related literature cited in the introduc-
tion, including Grossman and Noh, 1994, and McGuire and Olson, 1996).
The producers react to such rates by optimally setting their productive ef-
fort, something that results in deadweight costs of reduced production com-
pared to the cases without taxation and with optimal, welfare-maximizing
taxation. Nevertheless, a proprietary ruler who has signi￿cant enforcement
power in dealing with bandits would also be tempted to use that power
against the producers, and perhaps exceed the taxation levels that could
have been promised. The producers themselves are also less likely to just be-
lieve any promised tax rate unless it is close to what the ruler could extract
given his potential for violence, and will therefore take defensive measures
against the ruler in a similar way that they take defensive measures against
bandits. The costs that could come from such posturing and the resource
misallocation that they bring about would be in addition to those that come
just from having a suboptimal tax rate.
Let G denote the number of guards hired by ruler and continue denoting
by P the total number of producers. Then, each producer would receive




P : The wage received by
guards is the going rate in this economy, which would be the payo⁄ received
in the other available occupations of producer and bandit. For given num-
bers of guards and producers, and self-protection level x by a producer, the




P (￿ 1). Given, however, the ruler￿ s coercive machinery of guards at
his disposal, producers could retain only whatever they can keep from being
snatched away from them. One possibility is that producers can keep away
from the ruler what they keep away from bandits, which is x in the example
we have been following: It is possible, though, that the ruler could extract
more than simple bandits can, an issue that we will revisit shortly at the end
of this section. For now, though, we suppose that producers can keep away
8x share of their output away from the ruler.
That is, each producer obtains a payo⁄ of x(1￿x) and the ruler obtains
from each producer what is kept away from bandits (x+
q
G
P )(1 ￿ x) minus




a tax rate of x+
q
G
P ￿ x =
q
G








(1 ￿ x)P ￿ x(1 ￿ x)G (3)
where the ￿rst term represents the revenues obtained from the producers
and the second term is the cost of hiring the guards. In maximizing this
payo⁄, the ruler needs to take into account several constraints. First, any
choice of guards he makes subtracts from the population that is available to
become producers and bandits. That is, he needs to take into the following
population constraint:
N = P + B + G (4)
Second, the choice of guards a⁄ects the payo⁄ of bandits, which is the
following:











= 0 otherwise (5)




P < 1_ ). If there is perfect security (x +
q
G
P = 1), by de￿nition no
bandits exist.
The third constraint that the ruler needs to take account of is that, if any
bandits were to exist, they would need to have the same payo⁄as producers.
Given that the payo⁄ of a producer is x(1 ￿ x), the optimal choice of x is
the same as under atomized anarchy of 1=2; leading to payo⁄s for producers,
bandits (if any), and guards of 1=4:
The ruler then maximizes (3) subject to (4), (5), and the conditions that
the payo⁄s of all occupations are equalized. It turns out in this that the







Pr = 1: That choice along with the other characteristics
imply the following outcomes under monopolistic proprietary rule:4
￿ There are no bandits in equilibrium (Br = 0) with Gr = 1
5N and
P r = 4
5N;
￿ Total output is 2
5N;
￿ The ruler obtains a maximal payo⁄ of 3
20N;
￿ Producers and guards receive a payo⁄ of 1
4:
Compared to atomized anarchy, there are a lot more producers under
the single ruler and output is higher as well. Using the collective protection
technology is all responsible for this increase in the number of producers




20N) is appropriated by the ruler with what was received
under anarchy by producers and bandits now going to producers and guards.
When the ruler is better at extraction than bandits
In this analysis of the monopolistic ruler we have assumed that producers
can resist the ruler just as easily as they can resist bandits or, equivalently,
that bandits are as good at extraction as the ruler is. What if the ruler were
to be better than bandits at extracting ("taxing") the producers￿output?
Again, for simplicity, we consider an example. In particular suppose that for
any choice of x producers can keep away from the rulers only x2(< x) share
of their output. In that case the payo⁄ of producers would be x2(1 ￿ x).
The optimal choice of x would be xe = 2
3, the share that could be kept
away from the ruler would be xe2 = 4
9, the output of the producer would
be 1 ￿ xe = 1
3, all resulting in equilibrium payo⁄ of a producer of only 4
27
(compared to 1
4 under atomized anarchy or under a ruler who has the same
extractive capacity as bandits have). Despite the greater e⁄ort devoted to
4It can be checked that the derivative of the ruler￿ s payo⁄ function evaluated at Gr;
the point at which security becomes perfect, is positive and therefore no level of guards
lower than Gr is optimal.
Perfect security with no bandits would not necessarily be true under other functional
forms for the collective and self-protection technologies. The qualitative features of the
equilibrium, however, in terms of comparisons with atomized anarchy are general (see
Proposition 2 in Konrad and Skaperdas, 2010).
10self-protection (against the ruler), producers receive a lower share of their
output and produce less output.
Whereas the ruler can enjoy a higher tax rate (for any given choice of
guards), the output to be taxed is lower. Additionally, however, the hiring
of guards is also cheaper since the "going" wage, the equilibrium payo⁄ of
producers, is lower. It can be shown that the optimal choice of guards for
the ruler in this case is Ge = 1
10N, which results in perfect security and a
number of producers P e = 9
10N. Thus, the ruler hires fewer guards than
when extraction is not as easy and guards are more expensive to hire and
there are more producers and, but given that each producer produces less,
total output turns out to be lower ( 3
10N versus 4
10N, although total output
is still higher than under atomized anarchy).
The tax rate is higher (5
9), total output is lower; and the total cost of hiring
guards can be shown to be lower (xe2(1 ￿ xe)Ge = 4
270): Overall, though, it
can be shown that the payo⁄of the ruler is still marginally higher than when
his extractive power is lower. That is, if the ruler could commit to the lower
tax rate than he can impose, he would not want to do so.
4 Competitive Proprietary Rule (or, Orga-
nized Anarchy)
The pro￿ts received by the monopolistic ruler can be expected to attract
competitors. The type of competition usually examined by economists is one
in which di⁄erent ￿rms (or, adapted for this case, polities) would attempt to
attract mobile producers with lower prices (i.e., tax rates) and better pro-
vision of the public goods and services they o⁄er. But the central question
that emerges in such an anarchic setting is how the contract between the
￿rms and the producers will be enforced. A ruler could still extract more
from producers than promised and provide less collective protection and there
would be no legal recourse on the part of a producer in enforcing a previously
agree-upon contract. Moreover, the presence of potentially violent competi-
tors who contest a given ruler￿ s territory implies that the ruler might not be
even around to honor a contract even if he wanted to do so. That is, the
ubiquitous presence of coercion implies a very di⁄erent type of competition
than that of competing security agencies in modern rule-of-law state.
Suppose there are R rulers. Each ruler controls territory and his relation-
11ship to producers within that territory is the same as that of the monopolistic
ruler: the collective protection technology is the same and he hires guards
to protect the producers against bandits but also to extract tribute from
them. Again, for simplicity, producers are supposed to be able to keep away
from rulers the same amount that they could keep away from bandits all by
themselves (i.e., the share of output kept by a producer is x).
The major di⁄erence from both monopolistic rule and the ordinary mod-
eling of competition, though, is that rulers compete for territory and the
producers within them by ￿ghting with one another or by threatening to
￿ght. To do so, they need to develop a military capacity by hiring war-
riors, where Wi denotes the number of warriors hired by ruler i = 1;2;:::;R,
with each warrior having the same payo⁄ as producers and guards. in the
lords competing against one another is that they will have to hire warriors
as well. In particular, for a given total number of producers P, the number
of producers within ruler i0s territory is (assuming
PR






P for each i = 1;2;:::;R;0 < k ￿ 1 (6)
The parameter k represents the e⁄ectiveness of con￿ ict, the relative ease with
which a ruler can grab more territory at the expense of other rulers. Letting









(1 ￿ x)Pi ￿ x(1 ￿ x)(Gi + Wi)


















(Gi + Wi), provided











Each ruler chooses the number of guards and warriors he hires strate-
gically, so that these choice form a Nash equilibrium. For convenience,
and in analogy with perfect competition in the theory of the ￿rm, each ruler
takes the total number of producers as given. The population sorts itself
among producers, bandits, guards, and warriors, with individual identity not
12been essential since all occupations receive the same payo⁄. All occupational
choices and the rulers￿strategic choices are made simultaneously and have
to be consistent so that they add up to the total population. The equi-
librium concept de￿ned next is similar in spirit to static notions in general
equilibrium in which some players can have some strategic in￿ uence on a
variable.
Let a short-run equilibrium be numbers of peasants ^ P, bandits ^ B, and,
for each ruler i = 1;2;:::;R; guards ^ Gi and warriors ^ Wisuch that:
1. Each ruler with a payo⁄ function described in (7), takes ^ P as given,
and chooses ^ Gi and ^ Wi simultaneously with other lords so that these
choices form a Nash equilibrium;
2. The payo⁄of each occupation other than producer should be the same
or higher than that of a producer;
3. The number of bandits, ^ B; equals the sum of the bandits in all of the
rulers￿territories;
4. N = ^ P + ^ B +
PR
j=1 ^ Wj +
PR
j=1 ^ Gj:
It is theoretically possible for di⁄erent rulers to choose di⁄erent numbers
of guards and warriors that also result in di⁄erent security levels (in terms of
the total fraction of output that is protected from bandits) across di⁄erent
territories. In our example, though, the equilibrium can be shown to be
unique and symmetric and involves ￿just as in the case of monopolistic rule
￿perfect security, so that ^ B = 0:5 Moreover, there are analytical solutions to
the equilibrium numbers of the other occupations. It is instructive to ￿rst
see how equilibrium guards and warriors vary with the number of producers
as well as the number of rulers themselves (this is obtained by solving for the





k(R ￿ 1) ^ P
R2 (8)
5For general existence and uniqueness results for such an equilibrium, see Proposition
3 in Konrad and Skaperdas (2010).
13On the one hand, both guards and warriors are increasing in the number
of producers; the former are increasing because more guards are needed to
guard (and tax) the producers as the number of producers increases, whereas
the warriors are increasing in the number of producers because, as there are
more producers there are more rents to be fought over, and the marginal
bene￿t of an extra warrior increases. On the other hand, both guards and
warriors are decreasing in the number of rulers. However, the number of
individual hired as warriors (R ^ Wi =
k(R￿1) ^ P
R ) is increasing in the number of
rulers, something that shows that the intensity of this violent competition
increases with the number of rulers. Finally, we should mention the role of
the e⁄ectiveness-of-con￿ ict parameter k plays, as warriors are increasing in
proportion to the value of that parameter.
By substituting the values at (8) into equilibrium condition 4 above, we





where M = (5 + 4k)R ￿ 4k: The number of producers (and, consequently,
total output) can be shown to be decreasing in the number of rulers. By
substituting for ^ P into (8) and multiplying by R, we obtain the total number
of guards and warriors:








Whereas the number of guards is decreasing in R (to maintain perfect secu-
rity guards decrease proportionately to producers) but the number of warriors
increases as the number of rulers increases as rulers compete with one an-
other more intensely over a smaller number of producers. (This reduction in
producers and increase in warriors as the number of rulers increases is not
just a feature of this example but it is a characteristic of more general models
- see Proposition 3 in Konrad and Skaperdas, 2010.)
By substituting all the equilibrium values into the payo⁄ function of a
ruler in (7), we obtain the equilibrium payo⁄:
￿i(R;k) =
(3 ￿ 4k)R + 4k
4RM
N (10)
14As can be expected, the more rulers are around, the lower is the equilibrium
payo⁄of each ruler (i.e.,
@￿i(R;k)
@R < 0). That, is competition drives down prof-
its. Moreover, it can be shown that pro￿ts are decreasing in the e⁄ectiveness
of the technology of con￿ ict (i.e.,
@￿i(R;k)
@k < 0). The reason for this result is
that a higher e⁄ectiveness of con￿ ict increases the number of warriors that
each ruler hires and thus reduces pro￿ts.
Thus far, we have assumed the number of rulers as given. Given that the
pro￿t of each ruler is decreasing in the number of rulers, there are obviously
numbers of rulers for which pro￿ts would be too low or even, possibly, nega-
tive. In the long-run, in an analogous fashion to the theory of the ￿rm, with
free entry and exit we can expect the number of rulers to be endogenous,
given a ￿xed cost of entry into the protection business F ￿ 0. In particu-
lar, we de￿ne a long-run equilibrium to be a short-run equilibrium (that is,
numbers of producers, bandits, guards, and warriors) and a number of rulers,
^ R ￿ 2; such that:6
￿i( ^ R;k) ￿ F and ￿i( ^ R + 1;k) < F (11)
Given the properties of ￿i(R;k); the equilibrium number of rulers is decreas-
ing in the e⁄ectiveness of con￿ ict, k: That is, for higher levels of k; when
rulers have to hire more warriors for given values of the other parameters,
the resultant lower pro￿ts imply that fewer rulers can be supported in the
long run.
There is a general tendency in long-run equilibrium for the number of
producers to approximate from above the number of producers (and output)
under atomized autarky, with a higher entry cost F inducing more production
than a lower entry cost. In the limiting case of F = 0 and for high enough
values of k, the number of producers equals exactly the number of producers
under atomized anarchy (1
2N), whereas the number of guards equals 1
8N and
the number of warriors equals 3
8N: (When k = 1; the number of rulers ^ R = 4
and for k = 7
8 we have ^ R = 7:) That is all the extra output that could
be saved by using the collective protection technology is dissipated in the
con￿ ictual competition among rulers. What is appropriated by bandits in
atomized anarchy is now used in the employment of guards and warriors, with
some bandits possibly surviving on the edges (not in our example, but this
6If ￿i(2;k) < 2, then the long-run equilibrium involves just one, monopolistic ruler, the
case we have examined in the previous section.
15can occur more generally).7 Atomized anarchy is replaced by a di⁄erent form
of anarchy, that of organized, hierarchical entities clustered around multiple,
feuding rulers.
The model of this section can be interpreted as either a simple model of
interacting sovereign, proprietary states or as a model of pro￿t-seeking war-
lordism (within a formerly unitary state). Whereas the latter interpretation
is the one usually associated with the word "anarchy," the former is also
literally true. After a short excursus on the viability of democratic rule, the
last section will explore how rule could become consolidated in the case of
warlordism.
On the viability of democratic rule
In section 2, I brie￿ y alluded to what would occur if groups of producers
were to use the collective protection technology in a self-governing fashion,
something we can identify as "democratic" rule. While there is a free-rider
problem that becomes greater with an increasing size of the group, individual
welfare is higher than under atomized anarchy, monopolistic rule, or orga-
nized anarchy. Then, instead of producers acquiescing to proprietary rule,
why wouldn￿ t such groups form?
The challenge that such groups would face is that proprietary rulers would
attempt to conquer them, just as they do so against one another. The mem-
bers of the group would need to provide resources not just for internal protec-
tion against bandits but also for external defense against proprietary rulers.
Even if they were to provide the needed resources for external defense at the
group-optimal level, their relatively small size that is needed for the more
e⁄ective provision of internal protection would not allow much left for pro-
duction. In fact, in examples along those lines (found in section V of Konrad
and Skaperdas, 2010) the needed resources for external defense leave very lit-
tle for production and internal protection, so that internally there are too
many bandits relative to both proprietary rule and atomized autarky. No
examples have been found in which individual welfare under that type of
democratic rule was as high as that under atomized autarky.
That absence of examples in which democratic rule is viable mirrors the
historical rarity of that rule. It is, of course, of interest to ￿nd examples and
characterize the conditions under which democratic rule is viable. Among
7If rulers could extract taxes from producers more easily than bandits can, by the ex-
ample analyzed under monopolistic proprietary rule we can expect competitive proprietary
rule to be strictly worse than atomized anarchy.
16the conditions that could be explored are the following:
￿ By introducing di⁄erent productivities, producers with higher produc-
tivities could form their own groups. This feature would allow them
su¢ cient resources for adequate internal and external security, despite
their small size. This characteristic would ￿t the later medieval Ital-
ian city-states: They were usually more productive than other polities
(primarily due to their trading and specialized manufacturing) and also
smaller than their more autocratic competitors.
￿ Less e⁄ective technologies of con￿ ict would reduce the cost of exter-
nal defence enough to allow democratic rule. The early city states of
Sumeria and perhaps (depending on the interpretation) the city states
of classical Greece would ￿t this feature. (The Greek city states would
also ￿t the higher productivity case, especially in its initial stages when
the combination of olive, vine, and fruit cultivation as well as trade pro-
vided an advantage.) The introduction of the Macedonian phalanx and
later of the Roman legion can be interpreted as increasing the e⁄ective-
ness of con￿ ict, thus increasing both the size of proprietary states as
well as making democratic rule less viable.
5 Paths to Consolidation
Competitive proprietary rule or organized anarchy involves at least as much
waste of resources as atomized anarchy. Instead of just individual bandits
forming the main non-productive block, under organized anarchy guards,
warriors, some bandits, and rulers take their place without o⁄ering any-
thing that improves economic e¢ ciency. Societies cannot withstand such
conditions for long periods, as life is "nasty, brutish, and short." Empires,
kingdoms, even feudalism (for which competitive proprietary rule can be
considered a reasonable model) involve less waste and disorder. Mechanisms
develop so as to reduce the worst ine¢ ciencies and further consolidate rule,
although the benchmarks established by the coercive arrangements examined
thus far have lasting in￿ uence on what follows, especially as far as distribu-
tion is concerned.
There are two areas in which resources could be saved. First, there is the
deep adversarial relationship between ruler and producer, whereby producers
reduce production in order to take defensive measures against the agents of
17the ruler. Second, rulers could reduce the amount of resources expended
on contesting one another￿ s territory and the producers within them. Both
types of ine¢ ciencies could be reduced if the commitment ability of rulers,
with respect to both producers and one another, were to increase.
5.1 The folk theorem to the rescue?
In economics and rational-choice political science, one mechanism of implicit
commitment that has been emphasized is long-term relationships, with folk-
theorem type of arguments providing game-theoretic underpinnings. Under
inde￿nite repetition of the static interactions I have examined in previous sec-
tions, the di⁄erent agents could initially, in an implicit or explicit agreement,
adopt more e¢ cient strategies - the peasants could devote fewer resources to
protection and more to production, the rulers might demand less in tribute
than they could extract and, simultaneously, hire fewer warriors but keep di-
viding territory and peasants amongst themselves as prescribed by the static
equilibrium. If one side of a dyadic interaction were to choose to renege on
the agreement, then the other side would revert to a punishment strategy
that would involve the static ine¢ cient equilibrium for at least a number of
periods and possibly inde￿nitely. Under a su¢ ciently high discount factor
(a "long shadow of the future"), such strategy combinations, and thus more
e¢ cient outcomes, can form an equilibrium.
There are, however, a number of problems in considering a folk-theorem
argument as a plausible mechanism for alleviating the problems of organized
anarchy. First, there is a great multiplicity of equilibria, in terms of levels
of e¢ ciency and punishment, and the static, ine¢ cient equilibrium is still an
equilibrium in the repeated game. How do the many di⁄erent sides coordinate
on the particular strategy they will follow? Well, simplicity is one criterion
and the simplest, and focal, strategy is the static equilibrium. Moreover, the
punishment strategies are typically "non-renegotiaton proof;" that is, once
someone cheats, he or she could say: "sorry, I made a mistake and I will
not do it again. Could we just go back to the good strategies?" That is, the
static, ine¢ cient equilibrium appears to be the most plausible one to follow
by all sides.
Second, in our case, both the number of players involved is large and,
even more important, there are interactions at multiple levels. How would
the producers coordinate among themselves and with the ruler about the
amount of resources they will devote to production and protection and the
18level of tribute their ruler will ask in return? Moreover, if di⁄erent rulers
agree on di⁄erent levels of tribute and resources with their own producers,
then there might be incentives for some rulers to increase the number of
warriors they hire so as to take additional territory with more producers, and
possibly reneging on the agreement the previous ruler of the newly-acquired
producers. Additionally, with such serious loose ends in the background, the
rulers themselves need to coordinate on a lower level of warriors. Therefore,
in the case of our model, folk-theorem arguments not only face the problem
of coordination among a large number of players, but more seriously involve
signi￿cant interdependencies across essentially di⁄erent games in ways that
would make even the de￿nition of appropriate punishment strategies di¢ cult
and coordination across them even more so.
Third, folk-theorem arguments are made on the basis that the same game
will be played period after period. In the con￿ ictual conditions we have
examined, however, an equivalence that may exist between con￿ ictual and
settling-under-the threat of con￿ ict in one-period interactions can no longer
be assumed in multi-period interactions.8 In particular, if two rulers were to
￿ght instead of settling on a division of territory, the winner would gain an
advantage (more territory) not just in the current period but also, by virtue
of his increased ￿scal capacity, well into the future. The loser might even
be eliminated altogether. This type of non-stationarity makes punishment
strategies less likely to exist, and in limiting cases they might not exist at all.
Furthermore, higher discount factors in such settings, instead of facilitating
cooperation, induce more intense con￿ ict because the winner has more to
gain and the loser more to lose (for such models, see Gar￿nkel and Skaperdas,
2000, and McBride and Skaperdas, 2010).
Finally, the fourth problem with relying on folk-theorem arguments in
order to explain the emergence of more cooperative types of state rule is that
such arguments do not require any institutions, laws, courts, police, and other
state infrastructure that is observed in actual states. Solely relying on the
folk theorem would seem to imply no need for any organizations whatsoever.
8In the previous sections we have actually assumed that the rulers never ￿ght it out
and they just settle with the shares of producers they receive determined by their relative
number of warriors. However, these payo⁄s woule be equal to the expected payo⁄ under
overt con￿ ict. In multi-period interactions this equivalence of payo⁄s is not longer valid.
(See Gar￿nkel and Skaperdas, 2000, or McBride and Skaperdas, 2010.)
195.2 Investing in commitment (or, building a state)
In late medieval Genoa, after decades of internecine warfare the main com-
peting clans made an agreement to bring an external limited enforcer, the
podesta (Greif, 1998). A new podesta was hired from outside Genoa every
year and he performed basic administrative and police duties but his power
was limited so that the could not e⁄ectively ally himself with one the clans
against the others. All the clans contributed to the cost of maintaining the
podesta and in return they received some assurance that inter-clan warfare
would not take place, and this appears to have worked well for a number of
decades. That is, we can think of the clans, through their contributions to
hire a podesta, as making investments in (limited) commitment.
Those investments can take other forms as well, from meeting for social
and diplomatic purposes with other rulers, to creating a more formal "as-
sembly of rulers," to creating laws, courts, and enforcement agencies. Such
measures can contribute to increasing the ability of rulers to commit to one
another that they will not ￿ght or cheat in their dealings with one another,
though imperfectly so.9
We can model the "degree of commitment" that can be achieved by









]P where ￿ 2 [0;1] (12)
The parameter ￿ represents the degree of commitment (or security). Equa-
tion (6) is the special case of (12) for ￿ = 0: The polar opposite of that is
the case of ￿ = 1, whereby commitment is perfect and the sharing of the
producers among the rulers is ￿xed at 1
R: The greater ￿ is, the higher is the
degree of commitment that the rulers can achieve. The closer to 1 is to ￿,
the closer to "rule of law for elites" (North et.al., 2009) or to the state having
the monopoly in the means of coercion (Wallis, 2010) we can consider the
9Ostrom (2010) brings attention to a large number of empirical case studies and ex-
periments in which face-to-face communication as well as other agreements on monitoring
and sanctions for cheaters reduces ine¢ ciencies in common-pool settings. Although our
setting is somewhat di⁄erent from those that Ostrom has studied, the lessons are likely
trasferable.
10The approach follows McBride et. al. (2010). A probabilistic approach to the same
problem is found in Genicot and Skaperdas (2002). Both of those papers employ multi-
periods models in contast to the static model we use in this paper.
20outcome to be.
By modifying the payo⁄ function in (7), we can derive a new Nash equi-
librium among rulers which eventually leads to the following modi￿ed version









R ^ Wi(￿) =
4k(1 ￿ ￿)(R ￿ 1)
M(￿)
N (14)
where M(￿) = (5 + 4k(1 ￿ ￿))R ￿ 4k(1 ￿ ￿): An increase in ￿ (i.e., higher
commitment or higher security) plays the same role as a decrease in the
e⁄ectiveness of con￿ ict (lower k): Higher commitment capability increases
the total number of producers, increases the number of guards hired, but,
given that rulers trust one another more, decreases the number of warriors.
Naturally, given that there are more producers within each ruler￿ s terri-
tory and fewer warriors need to be hired, a ruler￿ s equilibrium pro￿ts increase
as well:
￿i(R;k;￿) =
(3 ￿ 4k(￿))R + 4k(1 ￿ ￿)
4RM(￿)
N (15)
Since ￿ can be thought of as a collective good for the rulers and there
might be actions they could take to modify it (by, for example, hiring a
podesta or simply starting to meet with one another for diplomatic reasons),
we can thing of commitment as a function of investments made by the rulers
themselves. That is, let ￿ = ￿(
R X
i=1
Ii), assumed to be strictly increasing in its
argument, where Ii denotes the cost of the investment by ruler i = 1;2;::;R.
Then, by ￿rst making investments before making the other choices, the ruler￿ s
















N ￿ Ii (16)
21We can analyze the Nash equilibrium in investments in commitment, with
straightforward results, with investments being higher the larger is the popu-
lation N and the smaller is the number of rulers R (see McBride et. al., 2010,
for details in a more general, dynamic model but with similar characteristics):
There are, however, some other important considerations that merit discus-
sion:
￿ The equilibrium and payo⁄s we have described here are for a given
number of rulers. Since there might still be entry of new potential
rulers, another consideration in the collective interest of existing rulers
is to take measures that will make new entrants less likely.
￿ The investments that maximize the sum of pro￿ts in (16) are clearly
higher than those obtained in Nash equilibrium. Therefore, a comple-
mentary consideration to increasing commitment and trust might be in
engaging in more cooperative behavior by making investments that are
higher than those in Nash equilibrium. Therefore, there are multiple
areas in which existing rulers could cooperate and increase individual
and collective pro￿ts: investing in commitment; increasing investment
in commitment to their collectively maximal levels; and engaging in
entry-deterring measures against potential challengers.
￿ All the rulers have been assumed to be identical up to this point. Break-
ing that symmetry can change some key results but also bring new in-
sights. For example, a simple way to break the symmetry would be to
modify (12) in the following way:







j=1￿j = 1;￿i 2 (0;1)
where the share received by each ruler is replaced in the case of perfect
commitment by an arbitrary share ￿i instead of the equal share 1
R: This
change might re￿ ect some initial advantage that some rulers might have
over others. When calculate the equilibrium results with this change
and end with a modi￿ed equilibrium payo⁄ function of (16) (which
would be di⁄erent for di⁄erent rulers), we can show that only the ruler
with the highest ￿i would have an incentive to invest in commitment.
We could conceive of that ruler as providing leadership, being ￿rst
among equals, and providing a way of thinking about how a King could
emerge out of a originally undi⁄erentiated mass of rulers.
22￿ One important caveat to the above discussion of asymmetry is that a
King, once he gains greater power than other rulers, might no longer
want to invest in commitment measures that bene￿t all rulers but would
want to enhance his power by creating a "King￿ s court" or a "Star
Chamber." Rule of law for elites is no simple matter to achieve.
￿ Also in the collective and individual interest of rulers is to decrease
the costs of extraction from producers. That could also be achieved
through investments in changing norms, through the acceptance and
dissemination of ideologies and religions that enhance their pro￿ts. For
example, having producers believe that there is single God whose sole
representative on earth is their current ruler is helpful in reducing re-
sistance and acceptance of the taxes they pay to that ruler.
Such considerations indicate the rich set of possibilities that exist in evolv-
ing beyond organized anarchy into the hierarchical proprietary states that
have existed in most of history (Finer, 1997, provides a grant overview as
well as detail of states in history). Their organization is more complex and
involves not just extracting tribute and providing collective goods but also
developing and maintaining intra-elite cooperation, and propagating unifying
and pro￿t-(and e¢ ciency-) enhancing ideologies among its subjects.
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